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VIRGINIA PROCEDURE
VIRGINIA PROCEDURE -PARTIES IN
LITIGATION INVOLVING AUTOMOBILES
EMERIC FISCHER
"Torts are in their nature joint and several and it is so
universally conceded that the injured party has the right to sue
all, or anyone, or any intermediate number of tortfeasors, that
it is not deemed necessary to cite authorities to sustain the
proposition."1 In general this statement holds true, for as a
matter of justice one who is injured or damaged ought to have
a remedy against the wrongdoer. But is it always true? An
examination of various statutes will disdose that procedural
impediments exist barring recovery in certain situations.
Guest Statutes
The owner or operator of a vehicle is not liable for injuries
or death to a non paying guest (or to his personal representa-
tive) whom he is transporting unless caused by the owner's or
operator's gross negligence or willful and wanton disregard of
the safety of the guest or his property. 2 The wording of the
statute indicates that a plaintiff, in order to recover for injuries
or damage sustained while riding in another's vehicle, must
plead and prove that (1) he was a paying passenger and the
operator was negligent, or (2) if he was not a paying passenger
that the operator was grossly negligent. The first inquiry must
be directed to the question of who is a non paying passenger.
In Hale v. Hale it was held that a passenger is a non paying
guest when there is no contractual relationship between the
parties under which the passenger was obligated to pay for the
transportation. And the mere benefit (to the host) resulting
from companionship (of the guest) or from assistance in
driving (by the guest) is not of a legal value sufficient in itself
to transfer a gratuitous undertaking into an undertaking for
payment. 4 But the plaintiff-owner does not lose his character
I BURKS, PLEADING AND PRACTICE § 55 (4th ed., Boyd, 1952).
2 VA. CODE ANN. § 8-646-1 (1950).
3 219 N. C. 191, 13 S.E.2d 221 (1941), tried under the Virginia statute.
4 Mayer v. Puryear, 115 F.2d 675 (1940), tried under the Virginia statute.
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of host and become the guest of his companion when he per-
mits the guest to drive the car for her own pleasure. 5 And where
payment, without request, amounts to more than a mere
social amenity and in fact is consideration for the transporta-
tion over a considerable period of time, then the payor is a
paying passenger. 6 And in Richardson v. Charles7 a salesman of
used cars offered to drive plaintiff to a neighboring town on
business because the salesman was unable to deliver the car
purchased by the plaintiff. On the return trip a collision oc-
curred. Held, that plaintiff was a passenger rather than a guest
since the trip was clearly motivated by the business transaction
between the parties. Payment does not have to be in cash,
services or other benefits can amount to payment. But assisting
defendant and his friend in transporting friend's materials in
defendant's truck does not amount to such mutual benefits to
both plaintiff and defendant as to remove plaintiff from the
status of a mere guest. 8 And teaching plaintiff to park is
merely a friendly act and a gratuity. 6 In White v. Gregory1 0
plaintiff was the employee of the owner of the auto and the
driver of the automobile was also the agent of the owner.
Plaintiff was injured while riding home in the auto for the con-
venience of the employer. The court found from these facts
that plaintiff was not a guest of either the driver or the owner
and therefore ordinary negligence was sufficient to make them
both liable.'"
The second inquiry revolves around the problem of what is
gross negligence. "In this class of actions the plaintiff must,
since the burden is on him to prove his case by a preponderance
5 Leonard v. Helms, 267 F.2d48 (1959), tried under the Virginia statute.
See also Parker v. Leavitt, 201 Va. 919, 114 S.E.2d 732 (1960).
6 Davis v. Williams, 194 Va. 541, 74 S.E.2d 58 (1953); Thomas v. Dowdy,
201 Va. 581, 112 S.E.2d 868 (1960). See also Gammon v. Hyde, 199
Va. 918, 103 S.E.2d 221 (1958) where payments were not continuous,
but the single unrequested payment was substantial ($50).
7 201 Va. 426, 111 S.E.2d 401 (1959).
8 Miller v. Ellis, 188 Va. 207, 49 S.E.2d 273 (1948).
9 Jenkins v. Womack, 201 Va. 68, 109 S.E.2d 97 (1959).
10 161 Va. 414, 170 S.E. 739 (1933).
11 See also Garrett v. Hammack, 162 Va. 42, 173 S.E. 535 (1934); Dicken-
son v. Miller, 196 Va. 659, 85 S.E.2d 275 (1955). But see Miller v.
Ellis, 188 Va. 207, 49 S.E.2d 273 (1948).
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of the evidence, establish not only the fact that the defendant
was negligent but that his negligence amounted to more than a
mere failure to exercise ordinary care. The burden was on the
plaintiffs in this case to establish how and why the accident
occurred and that this defendant was guilty of gross negli-
gence."12 In Alspaugh v. Diggs' 3 the court said:
A mere failure to skillfully operate an automobile under all
conditions, or to be alert and observant, and to act intelli-
gently and operate an automobile at a low rate of speed
may, or may not, be a failure to do what an ordinarily
prudent person would have done under the circumstances,
and thus amount to lack of ordinary care; but such a lack of
attention and diligence, or mere inadvertence, does not
amount to wanton or reckless conduct, or constitute cul-
pable negligence for which defendant would be responsible
to an invited guest.
In this case the defendant, while rounding a gradual curve at a
normal speed, leaned forward to light his cigar and suddenly
struck a light pole. There being no evidence that he took his
eyes off the road or failed to keep a proper lookout, plaintiff's
contention of deliberate inattention was not established. And
in Dishman V. Pitts 1 4defendant travelled at a lawful speed when
suddenly his car, which was in good condition, went out of
control, crossed over the center line, made a 180 degree turn
and was struck from the rear. There was nothing to show why
he lost control of it or that he was guilty of deliberate inatten-
tion in crossing the center line. Held, that this was insufficient
evidence to establish gross negligence. In Wright v. Osborne, s
it was held that violation of traffic statutes is negligence but it
is not gross negligence per se even though the statute defines
such violation as reckless driving. Gross negligence is that
degree of negligence which shows an utter disregard of pru-
dence, amounting to complete neglect of the safety of another.
The distinction between negligence and gross negligence is a
12 Crabtree v. Dingus, 194 Va. 615, 74 S.E.2d 54 (1953).
13 195 Va. 1, 77 S.E.2d 362 (1953).
14 202 Va. 548, 118 S.E.2d 509 (1961).
15 175 Va. 442, 9 S.E.2d 452 (1940).
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matter of degree. 18 And neither is a series of consecutive
violations, per se, gross negligence. Thus, defendant in making
a turn violated section 46-234 VA. CODE ANN. (1950)17 by
failure to give the hand signal, failed to pass beyond the center
of intersection in violation of §46-231I 8 and failed to use
reasonable care to see that such movement could be made in
safety (violation of section 46-233'9). Held that the cumula-
tive effect amounted to no more than lack of reasonable care. 2 0
And where defendant, a competent driver, had failed to renew
his license 2 1, and was operating his employer's truck without a
license at the time of the accident, did not constitute negligence
per se as to render defendant and his employer liable for the
death of a person killed by falling from the truck. 22
As to civil liability for damages resulting from criminal
violations see discussion under sections 8-646.3 to 8-646.8
infra.
The gross negligence rule is applicable to passengers who
are minors as well as to adults. Though a high degree of care
is owed children, being greater as the child is younger and less
able to look out for himself, an infant guest must prove gross
negligence to recover from the host operator or owner. 2 '
Death by Wrongful Act Statutes
VA. CODE ANN. section8-633 (Supp. 1960) provides for the
right to recover damages for the death of a person caused by
16 See also Sibley v. Slayton, 193 Va. 470, 69 S.E.2d 466 (1952) and
Hailey v. Johnson, 201 Va. 775, 113 S.E.2d 664 (1960). The Virginia
Court has consistently held that negligence to be characterized as gross
negligence has to be conducted of a wanton and willful nature such as
to shock fair minded men. E. G. Dingus v. Salyers, 194 Va. 615, 74
S.E.2d 54 (1953); Hailey v. Johnson, 201 Va. 775, 113 S.E.2d 664(1960).
17 Now VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-217 (1950) (1958 Repl. Vol.).
18 Now VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-215 (1950) (1958 Repl. Vol.).
19 Now VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-216 (1950) (1958 Repl. Vol.).
20 See also Brown v. Peters, 202 Va. 382, 117 S.E.2d 695 (1961).
21 In violation of VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-349 (1950) (1958 Repl. Vol.).
22 White v. Edwards Chevrolet Co., 186 Va. 669, 43 S.E.2d 870 (1947).
2 3 Ruett v. Nottingham, 200 Va. 722, 107 S.E.2d 402 (1959).
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the wrongful act of another. This section withdraws from the
wrongdoer the shield of immunity from civil liability which
the rule of the common law provided him. In so doing, how-
ever, it was not the intention to continue or cause to survive his
right of action for the injury, but to substitute for it and confer
upon his personal representative a new and original right of
action. 24 The Supreme Court of Appeals (of Va.) construes the
wrongful death statute as creating no new camuse of action hut a
right of action where no right before existed. The "cause of
action" is complete and accrued the moment the tort is com-
mitted, but the "right of action" for wrongful death does not
arise during the continued life of the injured person, nor does
the injured person's "right of action" for personal injury sur-
vive his death, if death results from the injury. 2 5 Problems of
assignability and revival of actions under this section are dis-
cussed under sections 8-628.1 and 8-640 infra.
This right of action (under section 8-633) survives the death
of the wrongdoer and may be enforced against his executor or
administrator, either by reviving against such personal repre-
sentative a suit which may have been brought against the
wrongdoer himself in his lifetime, or by bringing an original
suit against his personal representative after his death. 2; The
primary object of this section and sections 8-634 to 8-638 is to
compensate the family of the deceased and not to benefit his
creditors. 27 But in cases where the specified beneficiaries 28
don't exist (or are barred from recovery) and action for death by
wrongful act may be maintained for the general benefit of the
decedent's estate. 2 9 But the right of action of the personal
representative stands upon no higher ground than that of the
deceased and the action for wrongful death can be maintained
upon the condition that the deceased might have maintained
24 Anderson v. Hygeia Hotel Co., 92 Va. 687, 24 S.E. 269 (1896); Bramnmer
v. Norfolk Southern Railroad Company, 107 Va. 206, 57 S.E. 593
(1907), leading cases.
25 Grady v. Irvine, 254 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1958), tried under Virginia
law. See also Sherley v. Lotz, 200 Va. 173, 104 S.E.2d 795 (1958).
26 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8-633 and 8-640 (1950) (1960 Supp.).
2 7 Withrow v. Edwards, 181 Va. 344, 25 S.E.2d 343 (1943).
28 See discussion under § 8-636 infra as to who are the beneficiaries.
29 Smith v. Bevins, 57 F. Supp. 760 (D. Md., 1944) tried under Virginia law.
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an action, had he lived, for the injury resulting from the same
act or omission. 3 0 Thus a party who consents to and partici-
pates in an immoral or illegal act cannot recover damages from
the other participants in the act and therefore the personal
representative is also barred. 31 And the right of action must
exist at decedent's death. Thus the statute of limitation for
recovery for personal injuries being two years, 32 and the
statute of limitations for recovery under this section3 3 being
two years, the maximum time during which the personal rep-
resentative could bring an action is four years from the date of
the injury, unless the deceased started an action prior to his
death. . 4And only one recovery can be had whether the action
is brought by the injured party in his lifetime and revived after
his death, or a new action be brought by the personal represent-
ative within the statutory period. Thus if the injured person
sues and recovers or sues and loses it is res judicata and the
personal representative cannot bring an action for wrongful
death if the injured person later dies. Or if the injured person
dies during the pendency of the action that he brought, the
personal representative can either revive that action or sue for
wrongful death, but he cannot do both.3s Similarly, a fully
executed compromise settlement by the injured party bars the
personal representative from any further suits. 3 6
The two year statute of limitations operates as a limitation
of the liability itself as created and not of the remedy alone. It
is a substantive limitation and not just an ordinary statute of
limitation.7 For this reason defendant may plead the statute
30 Virginia Electric and Power Co. v. Decatur, 173 Va. 153, 3 S.E.2d 172
(1939).
31 Miller v. Bennett, 190 Va. 162, 56 S.E.2d 217 (1949). One example
that comes to mind; deceased, in concert with others, hauling illegal
whiskey or other contraband.
32 VA. CODE ANN. § 8-24 (1950) (Repl. Vol. 1957).
33VA. CODE ANN. § 8-634 (1950) (Supp. 1960).
34 Street v. Consumers Mining Corporation, 185 Va. 561, 39 S.E.2d 271
(1946).
35 Branner v. Norfolk Southern Railroad Company, 107 Va. 206, 57 S.E.
593 (1907).
36 Id. at 213, 57 S.E. at 596.
37 Continental Casualty Co. v. The Benny Skou, 200 F.2d 246 (4th Cir.
1952); Birmingham v. Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Co., 98 Va. 548,
37 S.E. 17 (1900).
VIRGINIA PROCEDURE
by demurrer.3 8 In light of this it is important to remember
that all matters pertaining to the substantive right of recovery
under this section, including the right to recover the nature of
the right, and the party in whom it is vested, are governed by
the law of the state where the injury resulting in death oc-
curred.39 And it is also well to remember that this section and
sections 8-634 to 8-638 have no extraterritorial effect.4o Thus
in a suit in Virginia under the Tennessee death act, which act
does not provide for a statute of limitation, the ordinary
statute of limitations (section 8-24) will be applied, and not the
one under section 8-634.4 1 And a Federal Court in another
state may entertain a suit based on this statute in spite of dis-
similarities between this statute and the statute of the other
state. 4 2
At this point it is appropriate to determine who cannot sue
or be sued under this section. A negligent plaintiff cannot re-
cover if he would benefit. Thus plaintiff's action for the negli-
gent killing of his infant son is barred if he proximately con-
tributed to the accident and would benefit from a recovery. 43
Under section 55-364 a married woman may sue and be sued
as if she were unmarried. In personal injury cases she may re-
cover the entire damage sustained including the expenses aris-
ing out of the injury, with the provision that all persons dis-
charging such expenses shall be reimbursed. Medical bills,
whether paid by her or by the husband, are included in what
she can recover. 4 5 She, and not the husband, can recover for
his loss of her consortium. 46 But Furey v. Furey47 held that
38 Dowel v. Cox, 108 Va. 460, 62 S.E. 272 (1908).
39 Betts v. Southern Railway Co., 71 F.2d 787 (4th Cir. 1934), tried
under Virginia law.
40 Sherley v. Lotz, 200 Va. 173, 104 S.E.2d 795 (1958); Withrow v.
Edwards, 181 Va. 344, 25 S.E.2d 343 (1943).
41 Additional implications of the "no extraterritorial effects" rule are dis-
cussed under § 8-636 infra.
42Rose v. Phillips Packing Co., 21F. Supp. 485 (D. Md., 1937); Lauria v.
Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 241 F.687 (E.D. N.Y., 1917).
43 Ratcliffe v. McDonald, 123 Va. 781, 97 S.E. 307 (1918).
44VA. CODE ANN. (1950).
45 United Dentist v. Bryan, 158 Va. 880, 164 S.E. 554 (1932).
46 Ford Motor Co. v. Mahone, 205 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1953); Floyd v.
Miller, 190 Va. 303, 57 S.E.2d 114 (1950).
47 193 Va. 727, 71 S.E.2d 191 (1952).
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section 55-36 does not confer the right to sue a husband, not
even for antenuptial torts. (It is the rule of the common law
that all liability for antenuptial torts is extinguished by mar-
riage.) 4s And Keister v. Keister 4 9 held that the personal repre-
sentative of a wife who was killed by her husband has no right
of action against the husband or his personal representative not-
withstanding Virginia Code section 2286-a (1904) (now section
55-36). 50 And an unemancipated minor child cannot sue his
parent to recover for personal injuries resulting from an act of
negligence.51 But an unemancipated child may maintain a
personal injury action against his unemancipated brother. Such
action is not contrary to public policy, nor can it be assumed
that to allow such actions will disrupt family harmony or open
the door to fraud and collusion because of liability insurance. 5 2
And one more CAVEAT: The rules discussed under the
heading "Guest Statutes" apply to this section as well as to
sections 8-634 to 8-638 infra.
VA. CODE ANN. section 8-634 (Supp. 1960) provides that
every action under section 8-633 shall be brought only by and
in the name of the personal representatives of the deceased
within two years of his or her death. If the action is brought
within such period and for any reason abates or is dismissed
without determining the merits of the case, the time such
action is pending shall not be counted as any part of the two
year limitation, and another suit may be brought within the
remaining period of such two years, as if the former suit had
not been instituted. However, the time within which such
action shall be brought shall not, as to any person who could
48 Reaffirmed in Vigilant Insurance Co. v. Bennett, 197 Va. 216, 89 S.E.2d
69 (1955).
49123 Va. 157, 96 S.E. 315 (1918).
60 See also Hargrow v. Watson, 200 Va. 30, 104 S.E.2d 37 (1958) where
one of the defendants was unable to prove a legal marriage at the time
of the accident.
51 Norfolk Southern Railroad Company v. Gretakis, 162 Va. 597, 174 S.E.
841 (1934). See also Brumfield v. Brumfield, 194 Va. 577, 74 SXE.2d
170 (1953). But see Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343
(1939) where it was held that an infant is allowed to maintain an
action against the parent for negligence where "the injuries [sustained]
were occasioned in the performance of the duties of a common carrier,
not in the parental relation [ship]."
5 Midkiff v. Midkifl, 201 Va. 829, 113 S.F. 2d 875 (1960).
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be made a party defendant but who has been without the
State, and who could not be served within the State, be con-
strued to include the time such person is without the State;
the absenting of himself from the State shall be construed as a
waiver of the defense of the statute of limitations as to such
periods of absence.
Under section 26-59 z 3 only residents of Virginia can act as
personal representatives and non resident fiduciaries must
have resident cofiduciaries. Where federal jurisdiction of a
personal injury action between a Maryland citizen and a Vir-
ginia citizen depended on diversity of citizenship and the
plaintiff died during the pendency of the action, the substitu-
tion of a citizen of Virginia, who was appointed administrator,
as party plaintiff and the amendment of the complaint to con-
vert the action into one for wrongful death, removed the
diversity of citizenship and the federal court lost its jurisdiction
over the action. 54 In effect, this means that an action for
wrongful death against a Virginia citizen (in Virginia) can only
be maintained in a Virginia State Court. But an Illinois ap-
pointed domiciliary administrator of an Illinois decedent killed
in an auto accident in Virginia could maintain an action under
the Virginia wrongful death act in a Federal Court in Maryland
against a Maryland citizen, notwithstanding section 26-59,
since bringing of an action in Maryland is not "acting" in
Virginia. 55 Furthermore, a suit in a Maryland Federal District
Court against Maryland residents under the Virginia wrongful
death act by a North Carolina administrator of decedent who
prior to his death was domiciled in North Carolina (but a
citizen of Virginia) and who was killed in an automobile col-
lision in Virginia is not prohibited by the Virginia Statute
(section 8-633 through section 8-638) nor by the Code of
Maryland of 1939 (Art. 67, sections 2 and 3). And the usual
prohibition against a suit by a foreign administrator (Va. Code
section 26-59) does not apply merely because section 8-638 in
certain contingencies authorizes a suit for the benefit of the
decedent's estate since in this case the decedent was survived by
certain statutorily entitled beneficiaries. 56
53VA. CODE ANN. (1950).
54Grady v. Irvine, 254 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1958).
5 5 Kaufman v. Service Trucking Co., 139 F. Supp. 1 (D.Md.1956).
56 Smith v. Bevins, 57 F. Supp. 760 (DMd. 1944).
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The two year statute of limitations may be pleaded by
demurrer since this limitation is not only on the remedy but the
right itself. 57 And the absence of the defendant will not alone
defeat the limitation of the death act. 58 The portion of the
provision of the statute excluding the time during which any
action brought within the two year period is pending, where
such action "for any cause abates or is dismissed without
determining the merits," is remedial in purpose, is to be
liberally construed and applies to a case of a voluntary non-
suit. 59 But this saving clause applies only if the latter action is
brought against the same person as named defendant in the
prior action. 0 
The personal representative is barred from suing for death
by wrongful act where an injured person makes a compromise
settlement therefor and accepts full satisfaction and dies after-
wards. 61 For additional situations where personal representa-
tive is barred see discussion under section 8-633 supra. As to
substitution of parties procedures see discussion under sections
8-628.1 and 8-640 infra.
VA. CODE ANN. section8-636 (1950) provides that the jury
may award such damages as to it may seem fair and just not
exceeding $30,000, and apportion it among members of the
one class of beneficiaries entitled to the damages in the following
order:
FIRST CLASS: Surviving spouse, children, grandchildren.
SECOND CLASS: Parents, brothers, and sisters.
But under section 8-638 it is provided that when decedent has
left a widowed mother and also a widow or widower, but no
57 Dowell v. Cox, 108 Va. 460, 62 S.E. 272 (1908).
58 Continental Casualty Co. v. The Benny Skou, 200 F.2d 246 (4th Cir. 1952).
5 .Norwood v. Buffey, 196 Va. 1051, 86 S.E.2d 809 (1955); McDonald v.
North Carolina Pulp Company, 198 Va. 612, 95 S.E.2d 201 (1956).
60 Lindgren v. United States Shipping Board Merchant Fleet Corporation, 55
F.2d 117 (4th Cir. 1932).
61 VA. CODE ANN. § 8-635 (1950) (Repl. Vol. 1957); Brammer v. Norfolk
Southern Railway Company, 107 Va. 206, 213, 57 S.E. 593, 596 (1907).
Powers of the personal representative to make compromises are discussed
under § 8-639 infra.
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children or grandchild, then the amount recovered shall be
divided between the mother and the widow or widower as the
case may be in such proportion as the jury may direct. If the
jury, prior to its discharge failed to apportion the damages then
the trial court shall do so in accordance with section 8-636,
subject to the jury verdict. The amount recovered shall be
paid to the personal representative and after payment of costs
and reasonable attorneys' fees shall be distributed according to
the apportionment, and shall be free from all debts and liabili-
ties of the deceased.62 But if there be no such exclusive bene-
ficiaries then the recovered amount shall be assets in the hands
of the personal representative to be dispose.d of according to
law.
Reading sections 8-636 and 8-638 together dearly indicates
that the beneficiaries are really the interested parties and it was
so held in Crawford v. Hite63 and the primary object of the
statute is to compensate the family of the deceased.64 The
class of beneficiaries described in these two statutes are ex-
clusive and judicial interpretation cannot add others. 65 But the
death of the class beneficiaries before recovery does not termi-
nate the cause of action.66 Nevertheless, there are circum-
stances in which a member of the class beneficiaries may be
barred from participating in the distribution of the recovery.
Thus a child of a meretricious relationship is barred.67 And so
62 But see VA. CODE ANN. § 32-138 (1950) as to liens on the claim of an
injured person: Any hospital, physician or nurse rendering medical atten-
tion or treatment to a person injured through the alleged negligence of an-
other shall each have a lien, for the amount of a just and reasonable charge
for the service rendered, on the claim of such injured person or his personal
representative against the alleged tortfeasor. Such lien shall not exceed
$500.00 in the case of a hospital, $100.00 for all physicians, $100.00 for
all the nurses. This section does not apply to payments made under the
Workmen's Compensation Act. For additional problems in recovery of
medical expenses by other than the injured party see City of Richmond v.
Hanes, 203 Va. 102, 122 S.E.2d 895 (1961) and Moses v. Akers, 203 Va.
130, 122 S.E.2d 864 (1961).
0a 176 Va. 69, 10 S.E.2d 561 (1940).
6 4 Conrad v. Thompson, 195 Va. 714, 80 S.E.2d 561 (1954).
65 Porter v. Virginia Electric and Power Company, 183 Va. 108, 31 S.E.2d 337
(1944).
66 Johns v. Blue Ridge Transfer Co., 199 Va. 63, 97 SXE.2d 723 (1957).
67 Grove v. United States, 170 F. Supp. 176 (E.D. Va. 1959).
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is a negligent plaintiffos (who also happens to be a bene-
ficiary), but such contributory negligence of one party does
not bar the whole recovery. Thus in Godfrey v. Tuckero 9 plain-
tiff could sue as administrator of his wife even though he was
contributorily negligent in the accident causing her death.
The award of damages should not have been to him as bene-
ficiary but to the other beneficiaries. However, the jury did in
fact make such an award and since defendant's counsel did not
object to an instruction that the jury could apportion damages
between plaintiff and the children he was estopped on appeal
to assert such judgment to be in error.7 o And the personal
representative of the wife cannot bring an action against the
husband who caused her death. 71 But a child of a bigamous
marriage may participate. 7 2 Since the wrongful death act has
no extraterritorial effect every provision thereof is applied
according to Virginia law. Thus where the only beneficiary of a
decedent is a child considered illegitimate in the State of birth
(and therefore not entitled to participate in the distribution of
the father's estate) but is considered legitimate in Virginia
(section 64-7) and the decedent and child were domiciled in
Virginia when the fatal accident occurred, the recovery ob-
tained shall be distributed according to the Virginia statute. 7 3
And by the same token, where the beneficiary accepts work-
man's compensation under the law of the state of her residence,
does not bar an action against a third party under the wrongful
death statute of Virginia, since there is no provision prohibiting
such compensation. 7 3a
Mere living apart does not bar a surviving spouse from par-
ticipating.74 Nor a spouse who deserted the decedent and
68 Ratcliffe v. McDonald, 123 Va. 781, 97 S.E. 307 (1918).
69 196 Va. 469, 84 S.E.2d 435 (1954).
70 But see City of Danville v. Howard, 156 Va. 32, 157 S.E. 733 (1931) where
the Court held that it was error for the trial court to have refused to set
aside that part of the verdict which allotted any sum to a father who was
guilty of contributory negligence in the death of his infant son.
71 Keister v. Keister, 123 Va. 157, 196 S.E. 315 (1918).
72 Withrow v. Edwards, 181 Va. 344, 25 S.E.2d 343 (1943); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 64-7 (1950) states that the issue of marriages deemed null in law, or
dissolved by a court shall nevertheless be legitimate.
73 Grove v. United States, 170 F. Supp. 176 (E.D. Va. 1959).
73a Betts v. Southern Railway Co., 71 F.2d 787 (4th Cir. 1934).
74 Porter v. Virginia Electric and Power Company, 183 Va. 108, 31 S.E.2d 337
(1944).
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lived in adultery. 74; And the award may exclude the children
and all given to the widow. 76 Furthermore the benefits can
apply to statutory beneficiaries who may have had no reason-
able expectance of support from the decedent. They may re-
cover for loss of care, attention and society as well as for suf-
fering and mental anguish caused them by his death. 7
To determine the elements and quantum of damages, what
may and what may not be shown? Crawfordv. Hite78 held that:
(1) Evidence of the financial condition of deceased is
not admissible.
(2) Nor is evidence to show the number of persons
dependent on deceased.
(3) But it is proper to show who the beneficiaries are
because they are really the interested parties.
(4) It is inadmissible to show the physical condition of
the beneficiaries to determine the liability of the defendant
or quantum of damages, but is admissible for purposes of
apportionment of the awarded damages.
Evidence that the deceased was a heavy drinker and a poor
family relationship existed can be introduced to mitigate
damages for loss of "care, attention, and society". 79 But the
damages are not confined to mere pecuniary loss and injury but
the jury may give such damages as may seem fair and just. 8 0
They may be exemplary, punitive, and given as solatium.81
Recovery may be measured by determining the probable
earnings during what would have been the prospective life of
the decedent. 8 2 In addition to financial loss it includes present
75 Matthews v. Hicks, 197 Va. 112, 87 S.E.2d 629 (1955).
76Patterson v. Anderson, 194 Va. 557, 74 S.E.2d 195 (1953).
77 Wolfe v. Lockhart, 195 Va. 479, 78 S.E.2d 654 (1953); Basham v. Terry,
199 Va. 817, 102 S.E.2d 285 (1958).
78 176 Va. 69, 10 S.E.2d 561 (1940).
70 Basham v. Terry, 199 Va. 817, 102 .2d 285 (1958).
89Matthews v. Hicks, 197 Va. 112, 87 SXE.2d 629 (1955).
81 Harris v. Royer, 165 Va. 461, 182 S.E. 276 (1935).
82 Gough v. Shaner, 197 Va. 572, 90 S.E.2d 171 (1955).
1962]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 3:403
and prospective loss of services, nurture and care and other
pecuniary advantages and benefits. 8 3 It is not necessary that a
child have earned money or have a present earning capacity for
his statutory beneficiaries to have suffered pecuniary loss be-
cause of his death.84 It is erroneous to give an instruction
limiting recovery to such sum as would equal the probable
earnings of the deceased.85 But that deceased received social
security benefits is admissible.86 Since the statute provides
that an award "shall be free from all debts and liabilities of the
deceased", hospital, medical, and funeral expenses are not
recoverable.87 The jury verdict assessing damages for wrong-
ful death is final and the Supreme Court of Appeals cannot dis-
turb it. 88 But under section 8-637 new trials can be granted as
in other cases. 89
This section (8-638) controls over the statute of descent and
distribution. 9 o And brothers and sisters of the half blood fall
in the same class as the parents. 01 And the right of the widowed
mother is not based on dependence nor is her remarriage a
bar. 9 2
As to compromise powers of personal representative, non-
assignability of these actions, and revival of actions see dis-
cussion infra under the appropriate headings.
83 Ibid.
s4 Ibid.
85 Wolfe v. Lockhart, 195 Va. 479, 78 S.E.2d 654 (1953).
86 Jessee v. Slate, 196 Va. 1074, 86 S.E.2d 821 (1955).
87 Conrad v. Thompson, 195 Va. 714, 721, 80 S.E.2d 561, 566 (1954). But
see note 62 supra.
88 Highway Express Lines v. Fleming, 185 Va. 666, 40 S.E.2d 294 (1946).
89 VA. CODE ANN. § 8-224 (1950) (Repl. Vol. 1957): "In any civil case or
proceeding, the court before which a trial by jury is had, may grant a new
trial, unless it be otherwise specially provided. A new trial may be granted
as well where the damages awarded are too small as where they are exces-
sive. Not more than two new trials shall be granted to the same party in
the same cause on the ground that the verdict is contrary to the evidence,
either by the trial court or the appellate court, or both."
9o0 Withrow v. Edwards, 181 Va. 344, 25 S.E.2d 343 (1943).
91 Wolfe v. Lockhart, 195 Va. 479, 78 S.E.2d 654 (1953).
92 Waters v. Harrell, 183 Va. 764, 33 S.E.2d 194 (1945).
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Incompetent Parties
It has been frequently overlooked (and for that reason it is
reemphasized here) that it is mandatory that any minor en-
tided to sue must do so by his next friend. 93 The next friend
need not be formally appointed and the court has the power to
appoint another if it appears that the original one is not
suitable. o4The consent of the infant is not necessary to author-
ize a suit on his behalf, but upon objection the court will ap-
point a master to ascertain whether the suit is for the benefit of
the infant and whether some other person would be more
suitable as next friend, and will make such order as seems best
for the infant's interest. 95 But the suit must be brought in the
name of the infant, not in the name of the next friend, that is,
the infant must be the real party plaintiff. 9 r The next friend
cannot waive the rights of the infant, and it is error to decree on
such waiver.7 If an infant sues to final decree in his own name,
the Supreme Court of Appeals can remand with the direction
that the decree be vacated and the cause be proceeded in by
the next friend. 98 On the other hand an infant having properly
sued under this section (8-87) is bound as an adult would be. oo
Infants and insane persons are sued in their proper names
but a guardian ad litem shall be appointed to defend them. 1 o o
A personal judgment rendered against an infant for whom no
guardian ad litem has been appointed is void. 10 1 If the decree
is beneficial to the infant, failure to appoint a guardian ad litem
is not reversible error. x 02 On compromises on behalf of in-
93VA. CODE ANN. § 8-87 (1950) (Repl. Vol 1957).
94Womble v. Gunter, 198 Va. 522, 95 SXE.2d 213 (1956).
95 Kirby v. Gilliam, 182 Va. 111, 28 S.E.2d 40 (1943).
96 Ibid.
97 Armstrong v. Walkup, 50 Va. (9 Gratt) 372 (1852); Hite v. Hire, 23 Va.
(2 Rand.) 409 (1824).
98 Kilbourne v. Kilbourne, 165 Va. 87, 181 S.E. 351 (1935).
99 Gimbert v. Norfolk Southern Railroad Company, 152 Va. 684, 148 S.E. 680
(1929).
100 VA. CODE ANN. §8-88 (1950) (Repl. Vol. 1957).
10I Moses v. Akers, 203 Va. 130, 122 S.E.2d 864 (1961); Kanter v. Holland,
154 Va. 120, 152 S.E. 328 (1930).
lo2 Langston v. Bassette, 104 Va. 47, 51 SE. 218 (1905).
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fants sections 8-169, 8-170, and 8-639103 have the following
provisions:
Section 8-169. The court shall have the power to approve
and confirm a compromise of the matters before it, including
claims under the provisions of an automobile insurance policy,
on behalf of infants, idiots or lunatics and it shall be binding
except where procured by fraud. An infant may not set aside
such order or decree unless he proceeds to do so within six
months after coming of age.
Section 8-170. In cases of personal injury104 to an infant,
idiot, or insane person, the parent(s) or guardian of such
infant or the committee of such insane person, or the person
who caused the injury, or the insurance carrier may on petition
to the judge hearing the case ask for approval of a compromise
on the claim, including any claim under the provisions of an
automobile insurance policy. The judge shall appoint a
guardian ad litem for the infant or insane person, convene all
the interested parties and shall issue his order or decree in ac-
cordance with section 8-169 or section 8-639.
Section 8-639. The personal representative of the deceased
may compromise any claim under section 8-633 (death by
wrongful act statute), including claims under an automobile
insurance policy, before or after action has been brought, by
obtaining approval, by petition, from the judge of the court
where the action has been brought or may be brought. All the
parties in interest must be convened, except grandchildren
whose parents are made parties to the proceeding. If the judge
approves the compromise and the parties do not agree upon the
distribution of the award, or any one of them is incapable of
making a valid agreement, then the judge shall direct a distri-
bution as a jury might direct under section 8-636 (discussed
supra). Such a compromise has the same effect and force as an
award under section 8-636.
This section (8-639), as well as sections 8-169 to 8-173
relating to compromises by fiduciaries on behalf of incompe-
103 VA. CODE ANN. (1950) (Supp. 1960).
104 When death did not ensue.
VIRGINIA PROCEDURE
tent parties, does not apply when full demand is paid. 1 o r As to
suit by nonresident guardian or representative see discussion
under section 8-634 supra.
The common law rule that an unemancipated minor child
cannot sue his parent to recover for personal injuries resulting
from an act of negligence is still the law. 1o6 But the common
law rule that a minor is liable for his own torts and another is
not liable therefore has been modified by section 8-646.2107
which provides that any owner of a motor vehicle who know-
ingly permits or causes, and any person who furnishes a motor
vehicle, to a minor under 16 who is not permitted to drive
under Chapter 5 Title 46 (now Chapter 5 Title 46.1) (section
46.1-357) shall be jointly or severally liable with such minor for
any damages caused by the negligence of such minor in driv-
ing such vehicle. In Hannabass v. Ryan 108 it was held that
since this statute is in derogation of the common law it must
be strictly construed. Joint and several liability with the minor
attaches only if he is not licensed by the state. A city ordi-
nance is not applicable in dealing with the rights and liability
of the owner of the motor vehicle. Thus where a minor under
16 is licensed by the state but prohibited to drive on the streets
by a city ordinance, the permitting owner is not liable for
damage caused by the negligence of the permittee minor driver.
The age limits for licensing of vehicle drivers are as follows:
School buses: Minimum age of 18, whether licensed or not.109
Public passenger carrying vehicles: Minimum age of 21,
whether licensed or not. 1 0
Private vehicles: Age of 18, except that minors over 15 may be
issued licenses if the application is signed by such persons
as this section"' requires and satisfactory evidence as to
his physical and mental qualifications is furnished. But if a
105 Hinton v. Norfolk and Western Railway Company, 137 Va. 605, 120 S.E.
135 (1923).
106 For the most recent case on the subject see Midkiff v. Midkiff, supra note 52.
107 VA. CODE ANN. (1950) (Repl. Vol. 1957).
108 164 Va. 519, 180 S.E. 416 (1935).
109 VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-169 (1950) (Repl. Vol. 1958).
11O Id. §46.1-170.
11 Id. §46.1-357.
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city ordinance prohibits a minor under 18 from driving on
its streets he shall be bound by such ordinance. 11
Other vehicles: Persons riding bicycles or riding or driving
animals are subject to the same traffic regulations as drivers
of motor vehicles. 113
Driving without a license: It is prohibited by section
46.1-349.1 14
As to recovery of medical expenses for a minor's injuries,
section 8-629, 15 provides that where there is an action by an
infant plaintiff against a tortfeasor for a personal injury, the
parent or guardian of such infant having an action against the
same defendant for the expenses of curing or attempting to
cure the injury to the infant, may join his action to that of the
infant by motion of any party to either case made to the court at
least one week before the trial, and both cases shall be tried
together as parts to the same transaction. But separate verdicts,
when there is a jury trial, shall be rendered in each case. In the
event of the cases being carried to the Supreme Court of Ap-
peals of Virginia, which may be done if there be jurisdictional
amount in either case, they shall both be carried together as one
case and record, but the Supreme Court of Appeals shall
clearly specify the decision in each case, separating them in the
decision to the extent necessary to do justice among the parties.
In Moses v. Akerf 1 the court said:
An infant is not entitled to recover the expenses incurred in
healing or attempting to be healed of his injuries in an
action brought against a tortfeasor to recover damages for
personal injuries unless (1) he has paid or agreed to pay the
expenses; or (2) he alone is responsible by reason of his
emancipation or the death or incompetency of his parents;
112 Ibid.
113 Id. §46.1-171. See also Laubach v. Howell, 194 Va. 670, 74 S.E.2d 794
(1953).
114 As to negligence aspects of driving without a license see text material to
which supra note 22 is applicable.
115 VA. CODE ANN. (1950) (Repl. Vol. 1957).
116 203 Va. 130, 122 S.E.2d 864 (1961).
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or (3) the parent has waived the right of recovery in favor of
the infant; or (4) recovery therefor is permitted by statute.
And in Watson v. Danie11" it was held that an action by a
father to recover medical expenses incurred as a result of injury
to his infant was held to be an action for pecuniary loss suf-
fered by his estate and therefore could be maintained by his
(the father's) personal representative under section 5385 of the
Code of 1930 (now section 64-135, Code of 1950) and the five
year statute of limitation is applicable. 18 The applicability of
the guest statutes and death by wrongful act statutes has been
discussed supra under the appropriate headings.
Under the common law a married woman had the status of
a legally incompetent person. This English legal barbarism has
been changed in Virginia (as well as in the rest of the States) by
Married Women's Statutes. The sections applicable within the
scope of this paper are: 55-35, 55-36, 55-37. Section 55-35
states that a married woman shall have the right to acquire,
hold, use, control and dispose of property as if she were un-
married. 119 Edmonds v. Edmonds12o stated that this section has
wiped aside every vestige of control the husband ever had under
the common law, as well as all his rights as husband except as
to curtesy. And Vigilant Insurance Company v. Bennettl21 held
that it also gives to her the substantive right to sue the husband
for tortious damage to her property (as distinguished from a
purely personal tort). But note that notwithstanding this
section the presumption (rebuttable) prevails that the husband
is the owner of all property in possession of the wife, especially
if they are living together as husband and wife. 122
Section 55-36 contains the following: A married woman
may sue and be sued as if she were unmarried. In personal
injury cases she may recover the entire damage sustained in-
117 165 Va. 564, 183 S.E. 183 (1936).
118 See VA. CODE ANN. § 8-24 (1950) (Repl. Vol. 1957).
119 VA. CODE ANN. § 55-35 (1950).
120 139 Va. 652, 124 S.E. 415 (1924).
121 197 Va. 216, 89 S.E.2d 69 (1955).
122 Childress v. Fidelity and Casualty Company, 194 Va. 191, 72 S.E.2d 349
(1952).
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cluding the expenses arising out of the injury, with the pro-
vision that all persons discharging such expenses shall be re-
imbursed. 123 Medical bills paid by the husband are recoverable
by her, not by him (but he does receive rei2burse4ent),124
and it is she who recovers for his loss of consortium and not
he. 12r, But she cannot sue the husband for purely personal
torts,' 26 nor can her personal representative recover for her
death caused by the husband. 127
Section 55-37 deals with the release of the husband from
the common law liability for the wife's acts: A husband shall
not be responsible for any contract, liability or tort of his wife,
whether the contract or liability was incurred before or after
marriage. 128 Since the husband's liability for his wife's torts is
completely abolished by this section, no action by him against
her be also against himself.' 29
Substitution of Parties and Assignability of Tort Claims
Rule 3:17130 states:
If a party becomes incapable of prosecuting or defending
because of death, insanity, conviction of felony, removal
from office, or other cause, his successor in interest may be
substituted as a party in his place.
Substitution shall be made on motion of the successor or of
any party to the action. If the successor does not make or
consent to the motion, the party making the motion shall
file it in the derk's office and the procedure thereon shall
be as if the motion were an original motion for judgment
against the successor.
123 VA. CODE ANN. § 55-26 (1950).
124 United Dentists v. Bryan, 158 Va. 880, 164 S.E. 554 (1932).
125 Ford Motor Company v. Mahone, 205 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1953).
126 Furey v. Furey, 193 Va. 727, 71 S.E.2d 191 (1952).
127 Keister v. Keister, 123 Va. 157, 96 S.E. 315 (1918).
128 VA. CODE ANN. § 55-37 (1950).
129 Vigilant Insurance Company v. Bennett, 197 Va. 216, 89 S.E.2d 69 (1955).
130 VA. SUP. CT. OF APPEALS RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE.
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Under section 8-628.1 no cause of action for injuries to a
person or property shall be lost because of the death of the
person liable for the injury or because of the death of the per-
son in whose favor the cause of action existed, provided that in
the latter situation no recovery can be had for mental anguish,
pain or suffering. This section shall not be construed to permit
the right to assign a claim for a tort not otherwise assignable or
to extend the time within which an action for any other tort
shall be brought.131 Compare now section 8-640 which
states that the right of action' 3 2 for wrongful death shall not
abate by the death of the defendant or the dissolution of the
corporate defendants. When an action is brought by an in-
jured person who dies during the pendency of the action, and
his death being suggested, the action may be revivedby his per-
sonal representative. If the death resulted from the injury, then
the personal representative shall amend the motion for judg-
ment and the pleadings to conform to sections 8-633 and 8-634.
Only one recovery shall be allowed for the same injury.133
To clarify this, it is apropos to state it as follows: If death is
the result of the injury the personal representative can sue under
the wrongful death act. If death is not the result of the injury
the personal representative can revive the action for the in-
juries as such, if the deceased brought an action during his
lifetime. Otherwise it dies with the deceased. It would, there-
fore, appear that in the light of the wording of section 8-241 34
the statute of limitations remains two years, not five years, as it
would be if the action were to survive. However the language
of these two sections (8-628.1 and 8-640) seems to confuse
rather than enlighten. A very great amount of litigation has
centered around the question of which statute of limitations
applies. The Court in Birmingham v. Chesapeake and Ohio
Railway Company13 agreed that the language is ambiguous,
but nevertheless it found no difficulty in holding that the
object of the sections is to give the right of revival in cases
where plaintiff in actions for personal injuries died pending the
131VA. CODE ANN. (1950) (Repl. Vol. 1957).
182 For distinction between "cause of action" and "right of action" see text
material to which supra note 25 is applicable.
188VA. CODE ANN. § 8-640 (1950) (Repl. Vol. 1957).
1834 The statute of limitation section applicable to personal injuries.
185 98 Va. 548, 37 S.E. 17 (1900).
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action, without regard to the cause of death, and not to make
all actions for personal injuries revivable (and thus holding
that the shorter statute applies). Similarily in Herndon v.
Wrickham 136 it was held that under section 8-24 of the Vir-
ginia Code an action to recover damages for personal injuries
must be brought within one year (now two) or within five years
from the time such injury was inflicted, depending on whether
the cause of action survives the death of either party. Section
8-628.1 did not change the one year (now two years) limitation
because prior decisions and the construction of prior acts show
that the legislature did not intend to change the period of limi-
tation applicable to actions for personal injuries.
Under section 8-628.1 no recovery can be had for mental
anguish, pain, or suffering,137 and amended pleadings are
required. 138
And the federal court loses jurisdiction where a resident ad-
ministrator is substituted for a nonresident plaintiff. 139
By 8-146 if any of several plaintiffs or defendants die,
become insane, convicted of a felony, etc., whether on
trial or appeal of the case, the suit may proceed for or
against the others if the action survive to or against them.
Where a party defendant sued jointly dies during the
pendency of an action, except a personal action which dies
with the person, the action shall not abate but may be
revived against the personal representative of the decedent.
If an action at law it shall proceed as a separate action
against the personal representative as though the decedent
had been a sole defendant. 140
The marriage of a female plaintiff or defendant shall not
cause a suit or action to abate, but upon affidavit or other
proof of the fact, the suit or action shall proceed in the new
136 198 Va. 824, 97 S.E.2d 5 (1957).
137 Seymour v. Richardson, 194 Va. 709, 75 S.E.2d 77 (1953).
138Ibid.
139 See text material applicable to supra note 54.
140 PHELPS, HANDBOOK OF THE VIRGINIA RULES OF PROCEDURE
IN ACTIONS AT LAW, 237 (1959).
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name, but if the marriage be not suggested before the judg-
ment, the judgment shall be as valid, and may be enforced
in like manner, as if no such marriage had taken place.141
... when a party dies, or becomes convicted of felony or
insane, or the powers of a party who is a personal representa-
tive or committee cease, if such fact occurs after verdict,
judgment may be entered as if it had not occurred. 142
8-148 provides in the case of marriage, death or other
fact on appeal, writ of error or supersedeas the court may in
its discretion, take or retain jurisdiction and enter judgment
or decree in the case as if such marriage, death or other fact
had not occurred. 143
8-150 provides that the new party may have in the dis-
cretion of the court a continuance at the term in which the
change of parties is made. He may also be allowed to
plead anew or amend the pleadings. Rule 3:13 may broaden
the application of the statute in some cases. ' 44
8-152 provides where the party whose powers cease is
defendant, the plaintiff may continue his suit against him to
final judgment or decree. 145
By 8-67.1 the appointment by a non-resident operator
(i. e., one operating either in person or by an agent or em-
ployee) of the Commissioner of the Division of Motor Ve-
hicles as attorney for service of process or notice shall be
irrevocable and binding upon the executor, administrator or
other personal representative of such nonresident.
Where an action has been duly commenced against a
nonresident operator (i. e., one operating either in person or
by an agent or employee) pursuant to the provisions of law
pertaining thereto and such nonresident dies after the com-
mencement of such action, the action shall continue and
shall be irrevocable and binding upon the executor, ad-
141Id. at 236, quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 8-147 (1950) (Repl. Vol. 1957).
142 Id. at 235, quoting id. §8-145.
143 Id. at 236.
144 Id. at 235.
145 Ibid.
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ministrator or other personal representative of such non-
resident, with such additional notice of the pendency of the
action as the court deems proper.
When such nonresident has died prior to the com-
mencement of an action against such nonresident, service of
process or notice shall be made upon the executor, ad-
ministrator or other personal representative of such non-
resident in the same manner and on the same notice as is
provided in the case of such nonresident motorist. 14 6
By 13.1-60 in the event the corporate name shall be
changed by amendment, no suit brought by or against such
corporation under its former name shall abate for that
reason. 147
It is a well known rule of law that mere rights of action for
personal injuries are not assignable and section 8-628.1 care-
fully spells out that it is not to be construed that it changes
this rule. In City of Richmond v. Hanes148 it was held that this
section cannot be construed to give assignability to a claim of
tort which was not assignable prior to the statute and therefore
payment by the City of the injured employee's medical bills
does not subrogate it to his claim for injuries. One cannot be
subrogated to a cause of action not assignable to it. But an
interesting situation is presented in Betts v. Southern Railway
Company149, where deceased's administrator commenced
action in North Carolina under the Virginia statute for wrong-
ful death. It was held that the administrator's right to maintain
the action is not, under North Carolina law defeated as a result
of the acceptance by the deceased's widow of compensation
under the North Carolina Compensation Act. The law of the
state in which an injury occurs cannot affect the right to work-
man's compensation under the law of the state of employment,
unless the law of the state of employment so provides. Thus
even though the Virginia Workman's Compensation law pro-
vides that acceptance of an award shall bar alternate remedies,
146 Id. at 237. For a full discussion of service of process see pp. 151-171, and
specially subpart J pp. 156-158.
147 1d. at 238.
14 8 203 Va. 102, 122 S.E.2d 895 (1961).
149 71 F.2d 787 (4th Cir. 1934).
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this only applies where the award is under the Virginia Act.
Furthermore since North Carolina law does not prohibit the
assignment of the right of recovery under the wrongful death
statute, the insurance carrier is subrogated to the right of the
beneficiary and has the right to elect to sue in the name of the
administrator against the tortfeasor. 1 o
Multi-Party Actions
The discussion heretofore was mainly concerned with indi-
vidual actions (except where joint parties were incidentally
mentioned). This part analyzes certain problems concerning
joint tortfeasors and third parties. Section 8-627' 2 r provides
that contribution among wrongdoers may be enforced when
the wrong is a mere act of negligence and involves no moral
turpitude. This changes the common law rule that there is no
contribution among joint tortfeasors.1 5 2 But it gives a right of
contribution only where the person injured has a right of action
against two persons for the same indivisible injury. Thus in
Norfolk Southern Railroad Co. v. Gretakis' r3 it was held that an
unemancipated minor child cannot sue his parent to recover
for personal injuries resulting from an act of negligence. So
where the parent and the railroad are joint wrongdoers (colli-
sion between train and auto caused by concurring negligence)
and the railroad paid the judgment obtained by the infant, the
railroad cannot sue the parent for contribution. Neither is the
rule changed by the fact that the father carries liability insur-
ance. 1 54 And under this statute not only a joint tortfeasor but
180 As to recovery by a father for medical expenses incurred on account of his
infant's injury see text material applicable to supra note 111.
151VA. CODE ANN. (1950) (Repl. Vol. 1957).
152 It was held in McKay v. Citizens Rapid Transit Co., 190 Va. 851, 59 SE.2d
121 (1950) that the statute of limitations does not begin to run against
the right to enforce contribution until the payment was made by one of
the tortfeasors or his indemnitor. And the cause of action in cases of this
kind arises out of an implied promise to pay and therefore the three year
statute applies (and not the two year statute applicable to personal in-
juries). See also Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Jewel Tea
Company, 202 Va. 527, 118 S.E.2d 646 (1961).
1583 162 Va. 597, 174 S.E. 841 (1934).
154But see Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939), where it
was held that an infant is allowed to maintain an action against the parent
for negligence where "the injuries [sustained] were occasioned in the per-
formance of the duties of a common carrier, not in the parental relation-
[ship]:'
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also his insurer, who has paid a judgment against him and
another joint tortfeasor has the right of contribution from the
latter. 15 5 Where a party is only a technical wrongdoer, and did
not actually participate in the wrongful act, such party, on
being compelled to pay damages to the injured party is en-
titled to contribution or indemnity from the actual wrongdoer.
Thus in McLaughlin v. Siegel 5r a master, who is not a joint
tortfeasor with his servant in the strict sense, is jointly and
severally liable to the plaintiff for his servant's negligent acts
and therefore if he paid off he can sue the servant for contri-
bution.157 The joint and several liability of a person who
permits a minor under sixteen to drive such person's auto-
mobile has been referred to supra. 15 8
Section 8-368 59 provides that in an action against joint
tortfeasors, a judgment against one is not a bar to an action
against others. The injured party may bring separate suits
against the wrongdoers and proceed to judgment in each, and
no bar arises as to any of them until satisfaction is received. But
plaintiff can enforce only one satisfaction and he must elect
against which one he will proceed to execution. After such
election and actual satisfaction it shall be a discharge of all,
except as to costs. "If plaintiff sues all in a single action and
all are found guilty, the verdict must be joint against all, and
... [t]he jury have no power to apportion damages among
them." 10 o But a release of one joint tortfeasor releases all even
if the release itself contains a statement reserving the right of
action against the others. 1 61 Under section 8-369162 if the
original defendants are liable, but any of the defendants added
155 McKay case, supra note 152.
156 166 Va. 374, 185 S.E. 873 (1936).
15T But see Drumgoole v. Virginia Electric and Power Company, 170 F. Supp.
824 (E.D. Va. 1959) : The United States is not liable for injuries to serv-
icemen and therefore is not liable in a suit for contribution by the other
tortfeasor.
158 Text material applicable to supra note 107.
159 VA. CODE ANN. (1950) (Repl. Vol. 1957).
160 BURKS, PLEADING AND PRACTICE § 58 (4th ed., Boyd, 1952).
161 McLaughlin v. Siegel, 166 Va. 374, 185 S.E. 873 (1936); Shortn v. Hudson
Supply and Equipment Company, 191 Va. 306, 60 S.E.2d 900 (1950).
162 VA. CODE ANN. (1950) (Repl. Vol. 1957).
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under provisions of section 8-96 are not liable, plaintiff shall be
entitled to judgment against those liable, and the ones not
liable shall recover costs from the plaintiff who shall be allowed
the same costs against defendants who caused them to be made
parties. Section 8-96163 referred to in the above section
.. provides that no suit shall abate or be defeated by the
nonjoinder or misjoinder of parties, plaintiff or defendant.
when such appears by affidavit or otherwise, new parties
may be added and parties misjoined may be dropped by
order of the court at any stage of the case as the ends of
justice may require.
The new party must, however, be a resident of the
state or subject to service of process therein. The place of
residence or service must be stated.
The new party cannot be added if it appears an action
cannot be maintained against him because the statute of
limitations has run (Ch. 2 of Title 8) or the statute of
frauds applies (Ch. 2 of Title 11).
Further, 8-96 shall not be consirued to permit the
joinder, or addition as a new party, of any insurance com-
pany on account of the issuance to any party to a cause of
any policy or contract of liability insurance, or on account
of the issuance by any such company of any policy or con-
tract of liability insurance for the benefit of or that will
inure to the benefit of any party to any cause. This pro-
vision has been used more broadly to aid the court in
interpreting the law applicable to fire insurance com-
panies as well as in cases involving liability insurance.
Miller v. Tomlinson, 194 Va. 367, 73 S.E. 2d 378 (1952).' 64
Hogan v. Miller165 stated that the settled rule in Virginia,
which has not been disturbed by the enactment of section 6102
of the Code of 1919 (now section 8-96), is that co-trespassers
are jointly and severally liable, and the party injured may sue all
of them jointly, or two or more of them jointly, or one of them
163 Ibid.
164 PHELPS, HANDBOOK OF THE VIRGINIA RULES OF PROCEDURE
IN ACTIONS AT LAW, 186, (1959).
165 156 Va. 166, 157 S.E. 540 (1931).
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severally, as he may see proper; and section 6264 of the Code of
1919 (now section 8-368) fortifies this conclusion. In distin-
guishing between "joinder" and "substitution" the Court in
Bardach Iron and Steel Company v. Tenenbaumio held that
"Nonjoinder means that a party has been omitted who ought to
be joined with an existing party, not substituted for an existing
party." That correcting a wrong name is not substitution is
evident from section 8-97 67 which states that a plea in abate-
ment for a misnomer is not allowed, but on affidavit of the
right name, the pleading may be amended by inserting the
right name. 1 08 Jacobson v. Southern Biscuit Co. 1 69 construed it
to mean that if the right party is before the court although
under a wrong name, an amendment to cure a misnomer will
be allowed notwithstanding the running of the statute of limi-
tations, provided there is no change in the cause of action orig-
inally stated.
Rule 3:9.1 170 abolishes third party practice in Virginia. "To
conform to this Rule 8-96 was amended by deleting 'and such
new parties defendant may be added upon the affidavit and
motion of any defendant, where it appears that such parties are
or may be liable to such plaintiff or defendant for all or part of
plaintiff's claim.' "171
Rule 3:9172 provides for cross-claims arising out of the
transaction sued on. The comment on this Rule 173 states that
Rule 9 allows a defendant to assert a cross-claim against a
co-defendant if it grows out of the transaction sued on. The
procedure will apply mainly in automobile accident cases in
166 136 Va. 163, 118 S.E. 502 (1923).
167 VA. CODE ANN. (1950) (Repl. Vol. 1957).
168 See also §13.1-60 in text material applicable to supra note 147.
169 198 Va. 813, 97 S.E.2d 1 (1957).
170 Supra note 130.
171 PHELPS, supra note 164 at 206. For additional discussion of third party
practice see Ibid.
172 Supra note 130.
173 Judicial Council for Virginia, Proposed Modifications of Practice and Pro-
cedure (1949).
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which plaintiff sues two or more defendants. The defendant
is not allowed to bring in new parties.174
Statements and Dispositions
Section 8-628.2175 provides that any person who takes a
signed written statement from a person who has sustained a
personal injury relative to such injury shall leave a copy of such
statement with such injured person at the time of taking such
statement. And section 8-309176 provides "No deposition
shall be read in any suit against any infant, insane person .....
unless it be taken in the presence of the guardian ad litem, or
upon interrogatories agreed on by him." "77
Miscellaneous Statutes
Section 8-646.3 .78 provides that any person violating any
provision of Chapter 1-4 of Title 46 (now 46.1) shall be liable,
in addition to criminal punishment, for damages suffered by any
person as a result of such violation. In Kidd v. Little*T9 de-
fendant truck driver was forced to stop suddenly to avoid
hitting another vehicle as a result of which plaintiff's motor
scooter following him struck him in the rear injuring plaintiff.
It was reversible error for the court not to make it clear to the
jury that defendant was not guilty of negligence solely because
he failed to give the signal required by section 46-233 Code of
1950 (now section 46.1-216), if he, without negligence on his
part, was forced to stop without time to give such signal. so
But in Jones v. Aluminum Window and Door Corporation i 81 where
plaintiff, a twelve year old boy, riding a bicycle on a dark, rainy
night was struck by defendant's truck, it was held, inter alia,
174 For a discussion of counterclaims and cossdaims see PHELPS, supra
note 164 at 197-205.
175VA. CODE ANN. (1950) (Repl. Vol. 1957).
176 Ibid.
177 For a detailed discussion of "deposition under 8-304 and 8-305" see
PHELPS, supra note 164 at 267-281.
178 VA. CODE ANN. (1950) (RepL. Vol. 1957).
179 194 Va. 692, 74 SXE.2d 787 (1953).
180 See also Whitfield v. Dunn, 202 Va. 472, 117 8.E.2d 710 (1961).
181 201 Va. 283, 110 S.E.2d 531 (1959).
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that an instruction that a driver who sees or should have de-
termined that a bicyclist is a child has a duty to assume he
might not operate the bicycle in a careful manner was properly
given.
Under section 8-646.4"82 if a person claiming damage as a
result of such violation (the previous section) shall deposit with
the court trying the criminal case a bond in an amount deemed
by the trial court sufficient to cover the probable damage that
the accused may suffer as a result of such prosecution, then the
court shall require the violator, or the owner of the vehicle that
was being driven by him, to deposit a bond or sum of money in
an amount sufficient to cover the damages suffered by the in-
jured party. But under section 8-646.518 if the owner or opera-
tor of the vehicle can show that he is covered by an approved
insurance policy, then he should not be required to post bond
as above described. If he cannot prove such coverage, and does
not post bond or money, then the vehicle shall be impounded.
If plaintiff recovers damages and costs, such impounded ve-
hicle shall be sold to satisfy such judgment unless defendant,
or someone for him, pays the judgment. Such seizure and sale
of such vehicle is subject to all valid and recorded liens
thereon. 184
Section 8-646.6185 provides that for the purpose of service
of process or notice, the operator of the motor vehicle which
caused the damage shall be deemed the agent of the owner and
service of process or notice upon such operator shall be equiva-
lent to personal service upon the owner. But it shall be a valid
defense to any such action for the owner of such vehicle to
prove that the same was being driven or used without his
knowledge or consent, express or implied, but the burden of
proof thereof shall be on such owner.
Under section 46.1-718 s every operator of a motor vehicle
shall have in his possession, while driving the vehicle, his
operator's license and owner's registration card and shall ex-
182 Supra note 178.
183 Ibid.
184 Id. §8-646.7.
185 Supra note 178.
186 VA. CODE ANN. (1950) (Repl. Vol. 1958).
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hibit it upon demand to any authorized'87 police or peace
officer. Failure to exhibit is a misdemeanor and subject to fine.
However, if he shall exhibit them to the same officer prior to the
return date of the summons, or produce them before the court
at the return date of the summons, he shall be deemed to have
complied with the provisions of this section, provided that the
documents show that they were issued prior to the time of such
demand. And under the following sectionl s 8 any authorized
peace officer shall have the right to stop any motor vehicle for
purposes of inspection. And under section 46.1-9189 any
authorized peace officer or Division officer or employee shall
have the right to inspect any motor vehicle in any public garage
or repair shop. Furthermore, sections 46.1-10 to -1219 0 require
that persons in charge of garages, repair shops, or automotive
service, storage or parking place shall report to the nearest
police station or to the State police any vehicle in their posses-
sion which:
(1) shows evidence of having been struck by a bullet
(report within twenty-four hours)
(2) is left unclaimed for more than two weeks and he
does not of his own knowledge know the name of the owner
and the reason for such storage
(3) has any radio transmitter, any short wave radio re-
ceiver capable of receiving frequencies of more than 1600
kilocycles, any bullet proof glass, or any smoke screen
device.
Under 46.1-1419 every person renting motor vehicles with-
out drivers must keep records showing the identity of the
person renting and the time during which it is in his possession.
Such records shall be public and open to inspection by any
person damaged as to his person or property by such vehicle
and by any police or traffic officer in discharge of his duties.
18 7 The term applies to one who shall be in uniform or shall exhibit his badge
or other sign of authority.
188VA. CODE ANN. §46.1-8 (1950) (Repl. Vol. 1958).
189 Id. §46.1-9.
190 Id. §§46.1-10 to -12.
191 Id. §46.1-14.
1962]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 3:403
Section 46.1-1761 92 requires that the driver of a vehicle in-
volved in an accident in which there is personal injury or prop-
erty damage shall immediately stop and report to a police officer
or occupant or attendant of the vehicle or property damaged his
name, address, driver's license number and vehicle registration
number. He shall also render reasonable assistance to any per-
son injured including the carrying of such injured person to a
physician or hospital.
If the vehicle or property struck is unattended and the owner
or custodian cannot be found he shall leave a note in a con-
spicuous place at the scene of the accident and report the acci-
dent within twenty-four hours to the Superintendent or, if the
accident occurred in a city or town, to the Chief of Police of
such city or town, giving the same information as required in
the personal report.
If the driver fails to comply with these provisions then any
person in the vehicle at the time of the accident shall report
within twenty-four hours to the Superintendent or Chief of
Police furnishing his name and address and such other infor-
mation that the driver is required to report and which is within
his (passenger's) knowledge. These provisions apply whether
the accident occurs on the public highways or streets or on
private property. Penalties are provided for failure to comply.
192 Id. §46.1-176.
